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THISTLETOWN: AN EXAMPLE OF
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL PARTNERSHIP
IN LAND DEVELOPMENT
BARBAA BENCE*
The federal-provincial instrumentality of joint participation in the acquisi-
tion and development of land for housing purposes, established under s. 35
of the National Housing Act (1949),1 has been employed in a number of
metropolitan areas including Lawrence Heights, York University and Edgeley
developments in North York, Stableford Farms and Malvern in Scarborough,
and Thistletown in Etobicoke. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
evolution of the Thistletown development from the raw land stage to an
"integrated" community, with reference to the legislative, administrative and
political framework of the participating levels of government. The social and
economic efficacy of partnership land assembly arrangements will be con-
sidered only tangentially.
In order to understand the inter-governmental conflict and tripartite
negotiation which characterized the Thistletown project, a brief legal-historical
overview of the planning and housing legislation in Canada must be considered.
Constitutionally, the legislative responsibility for "property and civil rights"
is vested in the provinces under s. 92(13) of the British North America Act
but "on the whole, provincial governments have been willing to leave to the
Federal Parliament the problem of providing a housing supply which is socially
acceptable and to the municipal government the responsibility of determining
the physical limits to which housing should be subject."2 The federal govern-
ment, through a series of National Housing Acts, has provided a financial
incentive for provinces to assume an aggressive role in land acquisition and
housing construction. The initial relevant legislation was the 1949 amendment
to the National Housing Act which inaugurated a land assembly and housing
program to be financed at a 75/25 federal-provincial cost sharing ratio. "It was
made clear.., that federal-provincial agreements envisaged in this amendment
to the act, depended upon local initiative. The amount of financial responsibility
placed upon local governments was a matter for the provincial governments,
after they chose to participate in the newly conceived federal-provincial part-
nership. ' Under the terms of the legislation, joint activity, i.e. financing, could
be undertaken in the acquisition of land, installation of services, and sub-
division of the area and construction of full recovery and/or subsidized hous-
*Member of the 1971 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 National Housing Act, R.S.C. 1949, c. 30, s. 35.
2 A. Wilson, Canadian Housing Legislation (1958-59), I-IH Canadian Public
Administration, 214.
3 Albert Rose, Canadian Housing Policies, Background paper prepared for the
Canadian Conference on Housing (October 20-23, 1968), 11.
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ing. Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 4 the federal housing agency,
was given specific power to undertake projects with the provinces or provin-
cial agencies pursuant to agreements between the Government of Canada and
the provincial government.
The next pertinent federal legislation was the 1964 National Housing
Act, which authorized 90% loans to provinces (and municipalities) for
public housing purposes, including construction and acquisition and a 50%
share of rental subsidies on the philosophy that,
public housing ought to be regarded as an inherent part of the planning and build-
ing of the whole community; the density and character of housing for low income
people ought to be integrally related to a municipality's open spaces and community
centres in both new suburbs and urban renewal. Consequently, the whole responsi-
bility for ownership, physical development and operation ought to be placed with
a municipality or its housing agency and the loan provision (s. 35D) was intended
to have this effect.5
Provincial enactments relevant to this study include the Housing Devel-
opment Act, wherein the Crown, in right of Ontario, was empowered to enter
agreements with the Government of Canada "respecting joint projects as con-
templated in s. 36 of the National Housing Act (1954)",6 and the Planning
Act,7 designed to facilitate municipal action in area development through
planning and zoning powers. A Housing Branch was formed in the then De-
partment of Planning and Development as the vehicle to co-ordinate federal-
provincial-municipal housing and land assembly programs. Housing Author-
ities to manage and administer local housing projects could be established by
the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council under s. 6(2) of the Housing Develop-
ment Act.8 The functions of these authorities were usurped in November, 1964
by the then newly created Ontario Housing Corporation.
Traditionally, housing and land use planning are municipal functions,
and the federal and provincial legislative enactments in these areas were de-
signed primarily to relieve the financial constraints confronting municipalities
when developing and servicing residential land. Because of the financial rami-
fications of providing physical and community services (i.e. welfare and edu-
cation) in suburban areas, most municipalities are loath to encourage resi-
dential housing, particularly low rental accommodation without a correspond-
ing increase of industrial development. The pernicious effect of municipal
reliance on a land tax as the main source of income is, in the words of one
commentator, to push "municipal governments into a ruthless competitive
scramble for those 'assessments' which produce high income and require few
expenses - commerce, industry and apartments for wealthy bachelor and
childless couples - and into equally ruthless measures to exclude families with
a small income and a large number of children."9 An attempt was made to
4 Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 46.
t Humphrey Carver, Unpublished Paper prepared for Canadian Welfare Council
Conference on Housing and the Environment (Toronto, August 1967), 12.
G Housing Development Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 182, s. 6 (1).
7 Planning Act, R.S.O. 1960. c. 296.
8 Housing Development Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 182, s. 6(2).
9 H. Blumenfeld, "The Role of the Federal Government in Urban Affairs," in
L. Feldman and M. Golddick, eds., Politics and Government of Urban Canada (Toronto:
Methuen, 1969), 178.
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balance the physical and economic needs and resources of the central city
and surrounding municipalities by the establishment of a metropolitan gov-
ernment in Toronto in 1953. Responsibility for planning and public housing
was divided between the Metro government and area municipalities and Metro
was authorized to share or contribute to municipal housing costs.
In assessing the success of public housing programs in Metro, the Royal
Commission on Metropolitan Toronto stated that,
the lack of progress in public housing in the Toronto area should not be attributed
solely to the metropolitan government. The situation has been substantially beyond
its control. The multiplicity of authorities concerned in housing involves agree-
ments between four governments and complicated administrative techniques....
A project must be initiated by a municipality or receive its approval if it is to be
located within its boundaries. But the area municipalities with available land have
been reluctant to accept public housing because of fear of its effects on municipal
land and school costs and on the values of existing residential properties and,
generally, because of the opposition of local residents to public housing in their
neighbourhood.' 0
Within this framework, the land assembly project in Thistletown was
launched on January 15, 1954 with the signing of a Land Acquisition and
Holding Agreement by the Federal Minister of Public Works, the Provincial
Minister of Planning and Development and the President of Central Mortgage
and Housing Corporation. The land acquired was primarily agricultural and
the bulk of it was purchased by the provincial Housing Branch in March,
1954, at an average price of $1700 per acre." The total acquisition at this
time was 484 acres and title to the land wds vested in Central Mortgage and
Housing Corporation. 12 There is little agreement as to the purpose of acquir-
ing land through this device and various theories have been forwarded, includ-
ing the notion that Partnership agreements are "designed to make reasonably-
priced serviced lots available in areas where a shortage of building sites was
limiting residental construction."' 3 Blumenfeld commented that Partnership
land assembly schemes "originated for the different and questionable purpose
of selling land below market value to private house builders"' 4 and although
this may have been one result of the goal, to provide housing at a reasonable
cost, it cannot seriously be considered the objective of the Partnership arrange-
ment. The former Minister of Labour, John Nicholson, suggested that the
"primary emphasis (of Partnership arrangements) should be on the quality of
community design rather than on the idea of a program large enough to affect
the market price of land."' 5 In the case of the Thistletown acquisition, it has
been postulated that "the original decision to buy the land in 1954 had been
' oReport of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto 1965), 53.
" R. Lillie, Thistletown Project Justifies Bold Far-sighted Planning (April, 1966),
Perspective, 4.
12 National Housing Act, S.C. 1953-54, c. 23, s. 37(4).
Is Report of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development (Ottawa, 1969),
5. (Serviced land may be scarce in some communities if local developers lack the initia-
tive or financial resources to assemble land.)
14 Blumenfeld, (1969), supra note 9 at 182.
15 Approaches and Priorities in Dealing with the Problems of Housing and Urban
Development, Background Papers, Federal Provincial Conference on Housing (Ottawa:
December, 1968), 10.
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largely influenced by the fact that possible sites for public housing in Metropoli-
tan Toronto were already very scarce and very expensive.., so it was always
contemplated that some of the land would be used for public housing."' 6 The
Thistletown project attempted to combine these three objectives.
Prior to the initiation of development plans, the land was leased at a
nominal rent to farmers and the Partnership paid a minimal payment in lieu of
taxes based on agricultural assessment. Although the Partnership took the posi-
tion that no tax need be paid, based on s. 125 of the British North America Act,
the municipality exacted an agreement whereby the Partnership would pay an
amount of $6.00 per acre prior to development.
The first positive step undertaken by the Partnership to prepare the land
for subdivision was in 1961 when the architectural services of J.A. Murray
and Henry Fleiss were retained to develop a conceptual plan for the entire
holdings and a detailed plan for the development of the first phase, consisting of
approximately 275 acres on the east side of Martingrove Road and flanked by
Albion Road, Kipling Avenue and the west branch of the Humber River. Simul-
taneously, an engineering survey on which servicing costs were estimated was
undertaken. It was on the basis of these estimates that monies were appropriated
by the provincial and federal Treasury Boards to proceed with the development.
At this time, there was in existence an official plan for the township of
Etobicoke which divided the planning district of Thistletown into three com-
munities, including an 800 acre tract which was already substantially developed
by private interests, a 420 acre undeveloped area held by private entrepreneurs
and the 500 acre Partnership lands. Official Plan Amendment 143 formed the
foundation for the development of the latter two communities, establishing a
Restricted Area Bylaw (agricultural zone) which could be amended to the
appropriate zoning classification following approval of the draft plans of pro-
posed subdivision by the Etobicoke Council if the subdivision plans conformed
to the principles of development policies and proposed land uses outlined in
the Amendment. The Amendment provided that the land within the Partnership
community should be classified at a density range of up to 15 dwelling units per
acre for single family dwellings, except for 15 acres on the south side of Albion
Road between Martingrove Road and H.E.P.C. transmission line right-of-way,
and 120 acres of land oriented towards open spaces and activity areas (schools,
commercial sites, etc.) which should be classified at a density range of 16 to 20
dwelling units per acre for multi-family and apartment buildings. A flexible
provision was included in the Amendment in that "public open space, institu-
tional and utility uses shall be deemed to be a part of this plan when specific
sites have been determined."
Using the Official Plan as a guide, the Partnership architectural consultants
devised a development scheme incorporating public and private rental and
16 Lillie, (1966) supra note 11 at 4.
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wholly-owned housing within the context of the Partnership goal of achieving an
'integrated' community. The proposal provided for the following land use distri-
bution:
Acres % of Total
Public Housing 72.6 15.0
Private Housing (land assembly) 145.8 30A
Private Rental 16.0 3.3
Senior Citizens 6.0 1.2
Total Residential 240.4 49.6
Shopping Centre 5.0 1.0
Schools 40.8 8.4
Clinic and Nursery 0.4 0.1
Churches 6.0 1.2
Other Institutional 10.7 2.2
Total Institutional 57.9 12.9
Public Open Spaces 23.4 4.8
Valleyland 74.0 15.3
Total Open Space 97.4 20.1
Unassigned Road Areas 13.1 2.7
Hydro Right-of-way 13.9 2.9
Industry 56.3 11.6
Total Project Area 484.0
Initially, the scheme was perceived as "an excellent example of farsighted
public enterprise, [the end result of which will be] a model of integrated com-
munity planning.' 7 Etobicoke adopted the principle of the scheme as its Cen-
tennial project and the Reeve of Etobicoke proclaimed,
In 1967 our work will be dedicated not only to 1200 households whose rent we will
subsidize but to the 3200 families who will live in a complete environment, with
a sense of community, and with full awareness of the dignity of the human being.'8
Unfortunately, these platitudes soon gave way to political realities and the
next two years were characterized by inter-government conflict over the devel-
opment plans. In Partnership land assembly projects, the federal and provincial
agencies perceived themselves as land developers in the same capacity as a
private developer. They were subject to the same myriad administrative proce-
dures as a private developer but because their motive - an adequate supply of
good housing at reasonable cost - was not as blatant as the profit motive of
private industry, the Partnership was deemed by the municipality to be a bene-
volent developer. Furthermore, at all levels of government, politicians and plan-
ners had emphasized the need to co-ordinate and de-compartmentalize housing
responsibilities in an effort to achieve the national goal of "decent, safe and
sanitary housing for all Canadians." Thus, the Partnership instrumentality was
more susceptible to municipal demands since opposition to local pressures was
17 Id. at 4.
I8 Address by Reeve H.O. Waffle to the 25th annual conference, Canadian Federa-
tion of Mayors and Municipalities, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 11-15, 1962.
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easily interpreted as defying the stated goal of providing adequate housing
accommodation. In a politically sensitive area, the senior governments could
not afford accusations of being hypocritical.
Clearly, there was a conflict of interests between the governments' housing
roles and their responsibilities. A municipality needs commercial and industrial
development as a source of financial input to offset the costs of local services in
residential areas, yet the federal legislation does not make provision for land
assembly for commercial purposes. 19 A municipality needs land for community
services such as libraries, community centres, parks, etc., yet non-residential
land use is beyond the constitutional purview of the federal government and, to
some extent, beyond the interest of the provincial housing agency. "They [the
Partnership] have to bear in mind that the prime reason for the project is to
provide lots for sale to prospective homeowners at low cost and if too much of
the land is alienated for non-residential purposes, the cost of the lots becomes
disproportionately high."20
Under the Planning Act, the Minister of Municipal Affairs has exclusive
control over subdivision approval and he has a permissive power, not a manda-
tory duty, to confer with officials of municipalities and departments of the public
service who are likely to be concerned with the plan.21 Under s. 28 (4) the
Minister is given a number of guidelines to assist in his decision, including
"whether the proposed subdivision is premature or necessary in the public
interest", "the adequacy of utilities and municipal services", and "the adequacy
of school sites". These considerations require communication with the munici-
palities and, as a matter of expediency, most subdivision draft plans are sub-
mitted to the municipal planning department for consideration by the planning
board and council before being sent to the Minister for approval. In the Thistle-
town development, rezoning of the area was contingent on the approval of the
draft plans of subdivision by the Etobicoke Council in accordance with Official
Plan Amendment 143. However, because of the provincial government's plenary
power in "property and civil rights" it need not await municipal sanction to
effectuate developmental plans.
One of the most important considerations in subdivision development is
the servicing of the land and the allocation of the servicing costs. Historically,
municipalities have installed services for raw land but another trend has been to
include in the development agreement a term requiring the developer to service
the lots, in which event "he will pass the whole of the cost (but not the risk) on to
his purchasers.... But the purchasers- are clearly not the sole beneficiaries of
1 L. Feldman, A Housing Project Wends its Weary Way (June, 1963), VI Canadian
Public Administration 227.20 Interdepartmental memo, G.G. Muirhead, Director of Planning, Township of
Etobicoke, to Ian Thomson, Recreation Director, May 9, 1963, Etobicoke Planning
Department files.
21 Planning Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 296, s. 29(3). It was recommended by the Ontario
Law Reform Commission on Community Planning and Land Use Controls that "where
there is an official plan in effect, and that plan deals, to the Minister's satisfaction, with
development policy, and he is satisfied that the local council has the necessary professional
staff, the Minister be authorized under s. 28 of the Planning Act to delegate this power to
the council of the municipality (subject to appeal to the Minister)," 29th Tentative
Proposal, at 69.
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streets, not to mention schools". 22 This term may be included at the instigation of
the municipality and often forms a condition of ministerial approval. The
municipality is given authority to enter into agreements with the developer pur-
suant to the conditions imposed by the Minister.23 The result of the legal and
administrative prerequisites for subdivision approval has been that "ministerial
discretion, rather than constituting a means of detailed provincial supervision,
has meant that municipalities can enter into a broad range of agreements at
their discretion with full legal support of the Province. '2 4 Approval of the sub-
division plan in the first phase of Thistletown by the Minister of Municipal
Affairs was delayed until the conflict between the Partnership and the municipal-
ity was resolved, although it is suggested that the Minister could have approved
the plan had he deemed it necessary in the public interest without waiting for the
endorsement by the municipality.
Several factors gave rise to the ensuing conflict between the township and
the Partnership regarding the development of Thistletown, including the urgent
need for serviced land in Metropolitan Toronto, government recognition of its
housing responsibilities yet inadequate machinery to effectuate (or even iden-
tify) housing objectives, the customary allocation of costs of services, and a
plethora of legal and administrative procedures which shrouded all land devel-
opment schemes. But perhaps the most important factor, albeit incapable of
documentation, was the dichotomy between the social and political philosophies
of the people engaged in the negotiations. Whereas Reeve Waffle was motivated
to claim Thistletown as a centennial project, Reeve McBeth (1962-66) was at
best suspicious of the plan and usually obstreperous and unco-operative in its
development.25 The first intimation of McBeth's posture in relation to the pro-
ject came on June 5, 1962 when his was the only dissenting vote in a Planning
Board recommendation to approve in principle the plan prepared by the Part-
nership.
The Planning Board's assessment of the project included the following
observations:
1. the allocation of three public school sites was more flexible than the
traditional 250 acre: one school neighbourhood standard previously
applied in Etobicoke;
22 J.B. Milner, An Introduction to Subdivision Control Legislation (1965), 43 Can.
Bar Rev. 74.
Also discussed in the Report of the Ontario Committee on Taxation, 1967, at 309,
and Ontario Law Reform Committee on Community Planning and Land Use Control,
Tentative Proposal 85.
This observation is particularly interesting in the consideration of government
sponsored housing and land development schemes since the impetus for public action
is provided by the need for accommodation at a realistic cost to those persons unable to
exert an effective demand in the private housing market. However, with the exception of
subsidized housing units, the costs of development are passed on to the purchasers in the
specific area even though the services for which those purchasers are paying are utilized
by people in the wider community. The provision of schools in the Thistletown area
should be cited by way of illustration-the school sites provided by the Partnership serve
an adjacent private development, yet the cost of providing the land for school purposes
was apportioned over the lots in the Partnership holdings.2 3 Planning Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 296, s. 28(7).
24 Report of the Ontario Committee on Taxation (1967), Vol. 11, 314.25 Alderman May Robinson at one point in the negotiations declared that the only
way the project would materialize was if Reeve McBeth were chloroformed. (Toronto
Star, August 29, 1963).
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2. the acreage allocated for parkland was adequate for the development;
3. additional valleyland acreage should be acquired by the Partnership to
be conveyed to Metropolitan and Regional Conservation Authority in
addition to the 74 acres held by the Partnership; (subsequently the
Partnership purchased 17 acres of this land);
4. institutional accommodation and sites were in conformity with the
Official Plan;
5. the five public housing sites were well distributed throughout the com-
munity and well-related to open spaces, schools, shopping and other
residential areas;
6. the disposal of private rental housing units (16 acres) tended to support
the social integration of the community. (The plan recommended devel-
opment for these sites at a density of 21-34 dwelling units per acre, but
the Planning Board suggested that the density range be kept to 16-20 in
conformity with the Official Plan);
7. privately owned residental sites comprising 103.8 net acres should not
be disposed of by the "land assembly" method (presumably the tradi-
tional 'first come, first served' criterion).
In summation, the Planning Board noted that "architecturally the plan is
extraordinarily well-conceived, with attractive street signs, and internal areas of
exceptional aesthetic appeal.... Similarly the social integration appears to be a
very successful combination of public and private, rental and privately owned
housing whose occupants share institutional buildings and common areas with
others, not only from the Thistletown district but all of Etobicoke." 26 Although
it was recommended that the road pattern be modified in order to facilitate the
development and future maintenance of the sanitary drainage system, there was
no suggestion that the land use distribution was dysfunctional in terms of physi-
cal and social community needs.
The development plan envisaged a two-staged program. Phase I was to
comprise: 573 housing units; 277 fully serviced lots for private housing; a
senior citizen apartment project (to be sold at cost to Metro and administered
by the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Company Ltd); Warrendale school;
10 acres of institutional use (community centre, fire hall, etc.); a neighbour-
hood shopping centre; three school sites; 49 acres of public open space; and
445 private rental units. A resolution of the Planning Board, dated January 22,
1963, recommended that the draft plan of subdivision of Phase I be approved
and forwarded to Council with the request that Council approve and release
the plan to the Minister of Municipal Affairs. Council, however, rejected the
Planning Board recommendation and the next fifteen months was a period of
tireless negotiations between Council members, city officials and Partnership
representatives with regard to the industrial land and the price of institutional
lands, including location and price of a hospital site. Obstacles subsequently
introduced by the municipality were phasing requirements and disposal prac-
tices.
20 Tenth Report of the Etobicoke Planning Board to Council, 1962, Etobicoke
Planning Department files.
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In the interests of simplicity and comprehension, it would be desirable to
discuss the land assembly project in the context of the two proposed plans of
subdivision (later, three plans were used) and the public housing project as
discrete transactions. But, although administratively they can be separated,
practically they were intertwined. Although the approval was required for
Phase I lands only, lands owned by the Partnership in the Phase II area were
the subject of bartering by the Partnership and the municipality. Furthermore,
the public housing scheme had yet to be sanctioned, but the effect of a low-
rental project was being anticipated by the municipality and many of its de-
mands were motivated by its unwillingness to receive and be responsible for
the social costs of public housing tenants. Clearly, the position taken by Council
was that if public housing was to be imposed by the senior levels of government,
the municipality should exact as many benefits and concessions from the Part-
nership as politically and economically feasible. The bargaining process in
these negotiations could in itself be the subject of a study in power relationships
since the Partnership legally could impose the plan on the municipality and yet
it chose to negotiate, acquiesce to and, only occasionally, challenge the muni-
cipal demands. The reason lies partly in the fact that the Partnership cast itself
in a role analagous to that of a private developer vis-h-vis the municipality and
partly in the fact that in an era characterized by cries of "co-operative federal-
ism" and pervasive government concern in social welfare programs, it was felt
that to impose unilaterally a plan without local sanction would not only alienate
the Township of Etobicoke but would jeopardize future housing projects in
Ontario requiring municipal co-operation.
Few demands and conflict resolutions were documented; most were
handled informally by the Housing Branch and the Municipal Council. How-
ever, one of the longest and most bitter controversies was that pertaining to the
price of institutional land to be conveyed to the municipality for community
facilities. The federal legislation did not permit the development of land under
the Partnership arrangement for purposes other than housing, so it was evident
that a portion of the lands acquired under s. 35A would have to be sold to the
appropriate agency for the construction of recreational and social amenities.
The site of the land was agreed upon (10 acres bordering on Albion Road) but
the Partnership was willing to sell the land at $4500 per acre and the munici-
pality was willing to purchase the land at $1700 per acre (the original purchase
price). The Reeve of Etobicoke insisted that "the federal government has been
very difficult to deal with on this project... Eand] refused to recognize a verbal
agreement that the land required for township purposes was to be turned over to
Etobicoke at its original cost price.' 27 By December, 1963, no agreement had
been reached and the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs suggested that the
dispute might have to be settled by arbitration imposed by the Ontario Munici-
pal Board.28 Eventually a compromise was proposed and accepted at a meeting
on February 3, 1964, attended by representatives of the provincial government,
including the Minister of Economics and Development and the Minister of
27 Globe and Mail, July 9, 1963.
28 Globe and Mail, December 24, 1963. An application could have been made
under s. 34(1) or s. 28(7) of the Planning Act for scrutiny by the Ontario Municipal
Board and this would have had the salutary effect of removing the dispute from the sensi-
tive political battlegrounds.
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Municipal Affairs, and the Etobicoke Board of Control. It was agreed that the
10.7 acres needed by the municipality would be sold at the raw land book value
of $3911.75 per acre and the Partnership would not be obliged to service the
land. The municipality insisted that no restrictive covenants be attached in the
deed, whereas the Partnership, not quite confident that the land would be used
solely for community facilities, sought to include a covenant restricting the use
to municipal purposes so as to preclude either a subsequent conveyance or lease
to a commercial company. A restrictive covenant was agreed upon.
In addition to land for recreational and other township purposes, Etobi-
coke also requested a 10 acre site for a proposed hospital not envisaged under
the Partnership plan. Again, the dispute arose, not over whether such a facility
was needed, but over the price the township would pay for the land. It was
agreed that a 10 acre undetermined site in Phase H lands would be offered to
the township at its raw land book value at the time of the sale. The meaning of
"raw land book value" was disputed by the Minister of Economics and Develop-
ment, who insisted it was based on net acreage after planning and preparatory
costs and the Reeve of Etobicoke who suggested it meant value based on the
acreage of the land in its agricultural state. Eventually, 15 acres of land for a
hospital were sold at $4000 per acre plus an additional 10 acres which were sold
at $10,000 per acre.
A future concern of the municipality was the development of industrial
land in the vicinity to increase the tax revenue and offset part of the cost of
residential demands. With this objective in mind, the municipality requested
that 50 acres of industrial land abutting Highway 27 be offered for sale by public
tender concurrently with the first tender call by the Partnership for the construc-
tion of the public housing units. It was agreed that the land would be sold at a
reserve price of not less than $6000 per acre and that immediate development
would constitute a condition of sale. Ultimately, this land, unserviced, was sold
to the municipality at $10,000 per acre.
By December, 1963, the municipal council was coming under public attack
in newspaper editorials as lacking a social conscience and being devoid of Metro
community responsibility. To buttress its position, the Council, on December 16,
referred the scheme for a special study to the Committee of the Whole with in-
structions to pay particular attention to projected education and welfare costs
which would result as a direct consequence of the development. The Etobicoke
Board of Education estimated that construction costs of three schools in Phase I,
based on a calculation of .9 children per unit and 1716 units, would amount to
$5,652,000. (Approval of a municipality's capital program was required by the
Metropolitan Toronto School Board, Metro Council and the Ontario Municipal
Board and was dependent upon the ability of the municipality to raise the funds
based on a debenture formula.)
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The welfare costs to the municipality of Phase I were anticipated to be
$35,200 based on the following calculations (the experience in the Scarlettwood
Public Housing Project in Etobicoke was used as a guide):
Total Rebates (from NetPublic Housing Expenditure prov. gov't) Cost
General welfare assistance $120,000 $120,O0 Nil
Homemaker and nurses services 5,400 2,700 $ 2,700
Special services (dental care, drugs) 9,000 Nil 9,900
134,400 122,700 11,700
Elderly Persons' Housing
Supplementary assistance 9,000 9,000 Nil
Other services 1,500 Nil 1,500
10,500 9,000 1,500
Administrative Costs
Staff and accommodation 22,000
Total cost to township $ 35,200
Other factors which concerned the municipality were:
1. need for a comprehensive schedule co-ordinating completion of the
development in an orderly and progressive fashion, e.g. shopping
facilities, schools, churches, institutional buildings;
2. immediate need for recreational facilities;
3. lack of adequate public transportation;
4. high concentration of subsidized rental housing units and its effects on
the residents;
5. effects of virtual isolation of the low income families from their places
of employment and friends as a result of being re-located from their
present homes many miles away from the Thistletown project.
The Committee of the Whole recommended to Council that the Minister's
approval be sought on the following conditions: that the agreement between the
municipality and Partnership in respect of industrial and institutional lands be a
condition of approval; that consideration be given to reducing the proposed
number of subsidized units (in the total project) from 1196 to 900 units; and
that consideration be given to staging the development in five phases.
The Minister of Economics and Development, in a subsequent communi-
cation, noted that although "it would not be possible to stage the development
on a time basis as demand for the lots and blocks for private development is as
yet an unknown quantity.., we would not proceed with development of further
public housing units unless the remainder of the area is substantially built up at
the same time,"29 and this was sufficient assurance for the Council to release the
plan for approval by the Minister of Municipal Affairs.
29 Letter dated January 14, 1964, from the Honourable Stanley J. Randall, Minister
of Economics and Development, to Reeve John McBeth, Etobicoke Planning Department
files.
1971]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
On April 21, 1964, a land assembly agreement was entered into which
formalized the conditions of development. A comparison of an adjacent private
development agreement (Martingrove Estates) with the Partnership land
assembly agreement is noteworthy in isolating standard terms and special
arrangements. Both agreements provided for engineering supervision and in-
spection of the services installations by municipal inspectors, the payment of
normal permit fees, levies of $2.50 per foot frontage for residential lands and
commercial lands (except shopping centres), $250.00 per acre for all industrial
lands and shopping centre sites, and $50.00 per unit for multiple-occupancy
dwellings plus $545.00 per acre3° for multi-dwelling sites to be used by Metro in
connection with the capital cost of sewers and the usual indemnity clause in
respect of township liability for claims arising out of the construction or installa-
tion of the services prior to the assumption of the services (i.e., three years in
respect of roads and one year in respect of other services following completion).
The private subdivider was required to post guarantee and maintenance bonds
and deliver a liability insurance policy to the township and pay cash in lieu of
land as its "public land contribution" under s. 28 (8) of the Planning Act.
The Partnership land assembly agreement, apart from apportioning the
capital cost between the federal and provincial governments, included the fol-
lowing special terms:
1. upon registration of the plan of subdivision, the Partnership would con-
vey to Metro six acres for a senior citizens' housing project at current
book value plus cost of servicing;
2. annual payment would be made in lieu of taxes, at $6.00 per acre until
title to the lots was conveyed;
3. the industrial site would be offered for sale concurrently with the com-
mencement of the public housing project;
4. an option agreement would be entered into with the township for a
hospital site;
5. the 10 acre institutional land would be conveyed to the township at raw
land book value subject to the restrictive covenant agreed upon;
6. the development of the public housing sector would be staged in relation
to private development;
7. a Design Approval Committee would be established to consider all
architectural plans.
Bylaw 14,507 to amend the existing zoning was passed on July 6, 1964,
and approved by the Ontario Municipal Board on September 18, 1964. It
implemented the approved plan of subdivision for Phase I by permitting varia-
tions in density, maximum yard distances between buildings, etc., which deviated
from the official plan. Provision was also made for a multiplicity of land uses on
a ten acre site fronting on Martingrove Road (uses anticipated were a shopping
centre, community centre, apartments, theatre, professional offices). This site
80 The legality of these imposts was sanctioned by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
an unreported case, Re Highbury Development and the Township of Etobicoke et al.,
October 24, 1961.
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was subsequently to become the source of another conflict between the Partner-
ship and the municipality.
Following approval of the plan of subdivision and the bylaw, the School
Board requested additional land which would increase the acreage of land avail-
able for school purposes from the original allotment of 40.8 acres to 60 acres.
The status of school sites in the area, the land for which was acquired at $25,000
per acre, was: three junior schools (one on an 11 acre site; two on separate
6 acre sites); one vocational school (10 acres); one secondary school (17
acres) and one middle school (10 acres); the latter three facilities were also to
serve the community outside the Partnership holding. In order to make addi-
tional land available for school purposes, the Partnership alienated land which
had been proposed for single family units and this resulted in what the township
considered to be a disproportionate ratio of multiple family units to single
family dwellings.
Phase II of the project was implemented by the registration of two plans of
subdivisions' following only one skirmish of note. After the Etobicoke council
and Planning Board had approved the plans (and by this time the proposed 245
unit public housing development in Phase II had been withdrawn from the
plans) the Planning Department advised the Ontario Housing Corporation that
it would not approve the plan because a planned diversion of Finch Avenue
encroached on School Board property and recommended that the diversion be
moved to the north which would have had the effect of consuming 17 feet of land
zoned for multi-family units on Partnership land. A letter from Mr. P. Brady, of
the Ontario Housing Corporation to the Mayor of Etobicoke illustrated the
exasperation felt by the Partnership:
We feel the time has long since passed for an objection of this kind to be raised. We
feel that the parties concerned have had ample opportunity to express their comments
on the proposed roadway at any one of the formal steps through which the proposed
plan of subdivision is processed. I might mention that it is also disappointing to us
that an attempt is being made to hold up the development of the project by an
organization which we feel has received considerable consideration from the
Partnership in making available to them such a large number of school sites. [Mr.
Brady then enumerated the amount of land made available for institutional use,
public purposes and industrial development, and concluded.) . .. As you can see,
the Partnership has been most generous. 32
In July, 1964, the Thistletown development was officially inaugurated by a
sod-turning ceremony with representatives of the federal, provincial and munici-
pal governments participating. At this time it was thought that the project would
mark the beginning of a new era in housing development where public and
private housing occupants could enjoy full social integration in the community.
31 This is an interested commentary on intra-government co-operation. A subdi-
vision plan for the total lands in Phase II had been settled at the municipal level and upon
reaching the Department of Municipal Affairs for official approval was rejected as the
departmental study to delineate noise-prone areas, in proximity to the proposed airport or
in the line of flight patterns, had not been completed and there was some indication that
Phase II might be affected by this. Therefore, the plan was returned and two plans were
prepared, one in the area immune from the noise factor and which thus could proceed
immediately, and the other in the area, which might have required a readjustment in land
use and density patterns. This necessitated additional surveying to be undertaken and
was one cause of the delay in the preparation of Phase TI lands.
32 Letter from P. Brady, former Deputy Managing Director O.H.C. to Mayor E.A.
Horton, July 11, 1968, Etobicoke Planning Department files.
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On August 7, 1968, it was announced that the Thistletown public housing
project was being halted as it was "desirable to have smaller projects,"33 and
that the remaining land would be used for private development. The land in
Phase II is intended to be released under the auspices of the H.O.M.E. plan
leasehold program upon completion of the servicing requirements of the area.
This program, introduced in March, 1967, was a scheme whereby the land costs
would be removed from the initial package price of a house and the purchaser
could enter into an agreement with Ontario Housing Corporation to lease the
land over 50 years, or acquire it by means of a long term sale agreement over a
35 year period, or purchase it outright. Although the Land Assembly Agreement
did not specifically outline disposal techniques, it did establish a Design
Approval Committee which would approve the architectural plan of a pur-
chaser, consistent with the municipal building bylaws. This procedure was
established in order to ensure a modicum of design control over houses within
the development. Disposal alternatives had been considered from the first sub-
mission of the plan and the municipality favoured sale of the land by tender to
private builders, which was a departure from previous Partnership experience
whereby land was sold to individual buyers. Mr. W. Wroski, Planning Director
of Thistletown in 1962, noted that the customary disposal technique was inap-
propriate for the following reasons:
1. there was a good supply of fully serviced land in the Metro Toronto
area;34
2. the introduction of a relatively small number of lots at prices below
market prices would have no effect on the market prices established by
private builders for residential lots;35
3. there was no responsible argument whatsoever to support the distribu-
tion of lots on a first come, first served basis.36
He recommended that fully serviced individual lots be conveyed to private
builders, not the sale of blocks of lots, as it was thought that individual develop-
ment would result in greater architectural control and would ensure the dispersal
of higher income families in the project. Other reasons for rejecting the first
come, first served disposal method included a lack of familiarity by most pro-
spective homeowners with merchant builder procedures and the desire of the
Partnership to engage in design experimentation. It was decided therefore to
employ the builder proposal call technique wherein the land price was set at
33 Statement by P. Brady, O.H.C. spokesman, Toronto Star, August 7, 1964.
34 This observation was not consistent with the findings of the study by the Ontario
Association of Housing Authorities, Good Housing for Canadians (August, 1964) 34.
35 This observation was not consistent with the U.D.L opposition to the individual
sale of lots on the basis it was unfair government interference which would have the effect
of depressing prices of 1400 serviced lots in the area developed by private firms. Toronto
Star, May 2, 1963.
Bo W. Wronski, Report to Etobicoke Planning Board, June, 1962, Etobicoke Plan-
ning Department files.
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$7500 per lot (a price less than market but above cost)3 7 and builders were
requested to submit designs as the basis of their tenders, plus estimates of the
cost of the finished product to the consumer. Six proposals were received and the
lots were disposed of to four developers. The response to the builder proposal
device was hailed as "[proving] conclusively that private development com-
panies were willing to experiment in social integration and indeed prepared to
spend considerable sums of money in preparing architectural and planning
drawings and specifications towards this end. 38 This technique has been cred-
ited with developing "a substantial housing industry in Ontario which depends
to a great extent upon the activities of the O.H.C. and which is prepared to offer
good, sound and adequate housing at prices that appear to be reasonable."39
Three blocks in Phase I were developed in 1967 under the newly enacted
condominium legislation.40 Title to this land was conveyed to the Ontario Hous-
ing Corporation at 75% of the book value at the time of the sale with the view
that O.H.C. would convey the land to purchasers of the condominium units
under the H.O.M.E. program freehold scheme. The Condominium Act does
not make provision for land to be held in leasehold, and the technique employed
by O.H.C. was to take back a second mortgage at the value of the cost of the
land to the purchaser, thus reducing the initial investment cost of the unit.
A building proposal call was issued in respect of these three blocks com-
prising 298 units and prospective contractors were requested to submit design
plans, specifications, proposed fixed selling prices and financing arrangements.
These bids were reviewed by a technical committee at Ontario Housing Corpo-
ration which examined the documents with respect to prices, architectural and
design features and forwarded the proposals to the Corporation's Board of
Directors for approval. Usually, the lowest bid incorporating the essential design
characteristics and conforming with the municipal, provincial and federal build-
ing standards is accepted, although consideration is also given to the financial
status of the builder. Following the contract award, the builder must prepare
architectural and engineering drawings which require approval by C.M.H.C.,
O.H.C. and the municipality. The successful bid on the condominium project
was based on a fixed purchase price of $15,000 for a three-bedroom unit,
$16,000 for a four-bedroom unit and $17,000 for a five-bedroom unit (none
was constructed), excluding the cost of the land which was sold by O.H.C. at
$3220.00 per lot.4 '
37 E. Christianson, Urban Renewal Officer, Central Mortgage and Housing Corpora-
tion in an interview, March 8, 1970. Servicing costs amounted to approximately $18,600
per usable acre (170 acres after deduction of streets, parks, etc.). The land value in 1966
was approximately $5000 per acre based on original cost plus interest and charges. The
40 acres for 277 lots being sold to builders under this scheme were priced at approxi-
mately $48,000 per acre, and the cost price based on $23,600 per net acre would
approximate $4,000 per serviced lot. According to the Toronto Real Estate Board, the
average market price of a serviced lot in 1967 in Metro was $10,000 and the average
price of a serviced lot in Etobicoke was $12,000.88 Ontario Housing, XII (February, 1966), 14.
39 Rose, (1968) supra note 3 at 59.40 Condominium Act, S.O. 1967, c. 12.
41 Information obtained from Mr. A. Zimet, Vice-President, Bramalea Consolida-
tion Developments Ltd., in an interview, March 10, 1970.
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The public housing project in Phase I necessitated a separate agreement
between the participating levels of governments and proceeded not unlike public
housing developments in any Ontario municipality, notwithstanding the fact that
the Partnership already owned the land. The construction of public housing is
premised on the identification of need in the municipality and the municipality
must take the initiative in requesting low rental housing. In Metro, this require-
ment to initiate senior government action is largely illusory since if low rental
projects depended on local (municipal) requests, no public housing would be
built in suburban areas where the need, if any, is not as politically significant as
in the core city. Since the formation of Metro, all the requests for, or at least
approval of, public housing development have been at the urgence of the Metro
Committee on Welfare and Housing.
In 1964, when the public housing project was started, the pertinent pro-
vincial housing agency was the Housing Branch and the operative legislation
was s. 36 of the National Housing Act which provided that joint housing pro-
jects should be shared on 75:25 basis by the federal and provincial govern-
ments. It was customary in Ontario to apportion the provincial share of capital
costs of public housing on a 70:30 ratio with the municipality resulting in a
total cost distribution between the federal, provincial and municipal govern-
ments of 75:17%:7%. In 1964, after the first public housing segment of 309
units had been planned, the federal legislation was amended to include provi-
sions for financial assistance to a province or municipality in order to acquire
lands for public housing projects,4 to a maximum loan of 90% of the cost of
acquiring and servicing the land repayable within 15 years. By virtue of s. 35D,
C.M.H.C. could make loans to province and municipalities "for the recon-
struction or acquisition of a public housing project" to a maximum loan of 90%
payable within 50 years. S. 35E of the Act authorized C.M.H.C. to make con-
tributions towards the operating losses of subsidized public housing projects,
not exceeding 50% of the annual operating losses.
The procedure for inaugurating a public housing project under s. 36 of
the National Housing Act in 1964 followed the tedious path outlined by Lionel
Feldman in his article, "A Housing Project Wends its Weary Way".48 The
Rental Agreement to authorize the public housing scheme was signed on April
21, 1964, and was premised on the fact that "Metro has represented that there
is an acute shortage of low rental family housing accommodation in [Metro
Toronto] and has requested the Partnership to construct a rental housing pro-
ject". The agreement provided that the Partnership would carry out the engin-
eering design and installation of services including sanitary sewers, storm sew-
ers, catch basins, water mains and fire hydrants in accordance with municipal
standards. A term was included to ensure that municipal administrative costs,
e.g. building permits and inspection crews, were paid at a rate equivalent to
that required from private developers. The Metropolitan Toronto Housing
Authority was named the agency responsible for the operation, administration
and management of the project, however, following the establishment of the
Ontario Housing Corporation in August, 1964, this agency was dissolved and
O.H.C. assumed its property management functions. It was agreed that the
42 National Housing Act, S.C. 1964-65, c. 15, s. 35C.
43 Feldman, (1963), supra note 19.
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Partnership would pay the municipality an annual sum in lieu of taxes at the
full taxation rate, and any dispute as to the amount was to be resolved by the
Minister of Municipal Affairs. The cost-sharing arrangement was based on the
standard formula whereby Metro agreed to pay 30% of the provincial 25%o
share of capital costs and to participate in the same ratio in capital recoveries
or operating profits and losses.
It was on the basis of this agreement that the initial 309 units of public
housing were constructed following a builder proposal call. An additional 445
units were built on lands conveyed by the Partnership to O.H.C. and financed
under the new loan provisions of the 1964 National Housing Act. The lands
were sold to O.H.C. at 75% of the book value at the time of the sale (the
province had already contributed 25%o of the cost of purchasing the land under
the equivalent of s. 35A.) In a separate transaction, O.H.C. applied to C.M.H.C.
under the terms of s. 35D for a mortgage loan of 90% repayable in 50 years.
Additional advantage was taken of s. 35E provisions whereby the federal gov-
ernment agreed to pay 50% of the operating loss of the project.
The management responsibilities for the project were assigned to the
Property Management Division of the Ontario Housing Corporation. The rent
scale for tenants in the project was related to family income rather than the size
of accommodation provided in the public housing projects and ranged from
16.7% on income up to $192 per month to 30% on incomes of $560.
An evaluation of the Thistletown experience is meaningful only in relation
to the expressed or implicit objectives of the Partnership at the commencement
of the project. These objectives may be summarized as follows:
1. to encourage local participation in the provision of housing on the
premise that those closest to the tangible needs of the people should
identify and satisfy those needs;"
2. to produce an "integrated" community responsive to the environ-
mental and psychological needs of the residents;
3. to increase the stock of low rental housing in the Metropolitan area;
4. to increase the supply of reasonably priced serviced land in Metro-
politan Toronto;
5. to encourage public and private participation in the construction of
housing.
The initial acquisition of the land was proposed and implemented by the
Housing Branch and C.M.H.C. without local consultation, thus affecting future
municipal planning decisions which in reality had to be made in reference to
the fact that the Partnership owned 500 acres of land in the municipality with
a view to developing it as a land assembly and housing project. The official plan
reflected the municipality's recognition of the Partnership intentions. Within a
circumscribed sphere, therefore, it could be stated that the municipality did
participate in the enunciation of local housing needs by determining density
requirements and detailed land use but in reality the general land use of the area
was established once the Partnership purchased the agricultural land.
44 Rose, (1968) supranote3 at 10.
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The municipality reacted more vociferously and negatively to the pro-
posed development plans of the Partnership. In 1962, the Etobicoke Council
rejected the contention that there was a need either for public housing or for
serviced land to be made available to potential homeowners at that time. From
the perspective of the municipality, this assessment was undoubtedly accurate.
Its vision was limited to a segmented geographical area, and political decisions
and priorities were established by balancing the needs and resources of the
community within the boundaries of this area. The senior levels of government,
including Metro, were required to take a more global view, and, in reference to
the demands of their broader political communities it was clear that there was
a present need for low-rental housing and serviced lots. Because of the dis-
parity between the needs and priorities of suburban communities and the social
and physical demands of the entire Metropolitan area, local initiative is an
idealistic goal and virtually unattainable in projects destined for area munici-
palities.
A further deterrent to local initiative is that historically, the role of the
municipality in land development schemes has been passive. The municipality,
having established the general land use designation and building standards,
reacts to development proposals; it does not undertake positive measures to
generate or implement specific land utilization. This function of the munici-
pality is made more difficult when negotiating with the senior levels of govern-
ment acting as a developer because of the economic, social and political impli-
cations of government sponsored programs. Once having fulfilled their "devel-
opment" role, the senior governments withdraw, leaving the attendant problems
to the fate of the municipality's financial and political ability to cope with them.
Thistletown is not a model "integrated" community. An identifiable schism
between the private homeowners and apartment residents and the public hous-
ing tenants was noticeable at the early stages of the development, and there has
been little social interaction between these groups. In the first place, specific
housing types are physically separated, causing the public housing units to be
distinguishable from private housing and apartments. This defect in the integ-
ration plan was detected when the development proposal was first presented;
however, it was noted that this failing would be overridden by "the practical
exigencies of development, and the attempt to give some architectural signi-
ficance to each of the concentrations". 45 Secondly, most of the public housing
conglomerates are flanked by schools and churches or parks, thus segregating
them further from the "human" elements of the rest of the development. Since
the public housing sector was the first to be developed, the area was soon marked
with the stigma of being a low-rent area resulting in future residents deliberately
avoiding communication with the public housing tenants. There is today, as
twelve years ago, a widespread belief that "failure to secure adequate housing,
particularly failure to attain home ownership, is the fault of the individual
rather than a responsibility shared by society in general",46 and many of the
Thistletown residents were proponents of this philosophy.
45 Tenth Report of the Etobicoke Planning Board to Council, 1962, Etobicoke
Planning Department files.
46 Albert Rose, Regent Park: A Study in Slum Clearance (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1958) 218.
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Because of the poor distribution of public housing throughout the area, by
the summer of 1968 there were indications that the anticipated integration of
public housing residents into the community was not going to be effected with-
out protest. Residents in the private sector documented cases of stolen bicycles
and damaged shrubbery as proof that the area was turning into a private slum.47
O.H.C. intimated that the municipality had defaulted on its responsibility by not
providing schools, recreation facilities and community programs to correspond
with the building development. This suggestion was countered by the statement
that "we feel the other agencies [O.H.C. and C.M.H.C.] should at least provide
the land free for the necessary social facilities, but they didn't even see fit to do
that." 48
On October 6, 1969, in a Planning Board Report to Council, it was re-
commended that because the area was experiencing serious social problems due
to its high density population and large number of subsidized low rental hous-
ing units, the 10 acre site at the north-east comer of John Garland BIlvd. and
Martingrove Road (which has a multi-use zoning with a maximum density of
35 units per acre under by-law 14,507) be considered for purchase by the
municipality for use as a community centre. Local resident groups and social
service agencies supported this recommendation in representations to Council
and one alderman went on record as saying that the social problems in Thistle-
town were anticipated by Council seven years ago when the federal-provincial
project was proposed.49 Prior to this recommendation, in June, 1969, the land
had been sold by the Partnership to J. D. S. Pinetree Ltd., on the condition that
the purchaser could obtain a re-zoning, and the purchase price was dependent
on the approved density.50 Had the purchaser applied for a building permit in
compliance with the then present zoning restrictions, the municipality would
have been under a duty to issue it insofar as the plans conformed to the muni-
cipal building standards,51 but because of its application for re-zoning, the site
has become the centre of conflict between public and private interests. A recent
commentary on Thistletown noted:
Northern Etobicoke is a classic example of a new suburban phenomenon-an over-
night housing development with a runaway population growth and no priorities
given to the provision of services and facilities that bear directly on the quality of
human life.
There are no accessible grocery stores, one swimming pool for 10,000 children,
totally inadequate and expensive transportation, schools so overcrowded that the
atmosphere is that of an institution, and social services that are scattered, piecemeal
and often inaccessible.52
The Thistletown project contributed a total of 754 units to the public
housing stock in Metropolitan Toronto, a figure which is insignificant in rela-
tion to the need for housing for low income citizens. According to the 1969
47 Toronto Star, July 5, 1968.
4 8 Controller David Lacey, quoted in the Globe and Mail, August 14, 1968.
49 Globe and Mail, January 17, 1970.
50 E.D. Christianson, C.M.H.C. in an interview, April 5,1970.
51 City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd., [1964 2 O.R. 269, 45 D.L.R. (2d)
211, [1965] S.C.R. 408.
52 "Housing, But Little Living", Globe andMail, April 9, 1970.
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O.H.C. Report to the Metropolitan Planning Board, the public housing distri-
bution in Metropolitan Toronto at the end of 1968 was as follows:
No. of Public No. of units per % of total public
Area Population Housing Units 1000 population housing stock
Etobicoke 291,000 2,272 7.8 11.6
Scarborough 317,500 3,664 11.5 18.7
Toronto 697,500 7,836 11.2 39.9
North York 451,000 4,970 11.0 25.3
York 146,500 575 3.9 2.9
East York 96,500 304 3.2 1.6
2,000,000 19,621 9.8 100.0
However, the Thistletown development does represent approximately one-third
of the number of public housing units in Etobicoke and this is an important
determinant in understanding the municipality's apprehension about the con-
centration of low-income residents in a defined area. It is of even greater signi-
ficance to note that by June 30, 1967, Etobicoke had only 902 public housing
units under O.H.C. administration.
A total of 277 lots were made available for single family dwellings in
Phase I (although only 245 houses were constructed, since part of the land was
sold to the Etobicoke School Board), excluding the 298 unit condominium
project, at a base cost of $7,500 in comparison with the average cost per lot in
Metropolitan Toronto in 1967 of $10,000. An additional 279 lots in Phase II
will be released under the H.O.M.E. program, making a total of 524 lots
alienated for single family houses out of a total of approximately 240 acres for
residential use of all types. The goal of affecting the price of land in Metropoli-
tan Toronto cannot be taken as a serious proposal of the Partnership in view
of its apprehension of upsetting the market mechanism by land disposal pro-
cedures. However, the introduction of 245 serviced lots in Thistletown repre-
sented approximately 30% of the total number of lots developed in Etobicoke
for single family and semi-detached houses in 1967.53
The intricacies in ascertaining land values are beyond the scope of this
paper but land values generally must bear a relation to the supply of serviced
lots and the impact of 245 lots being sold below market price in a developing
area is minimal. This is particularly true when considering that the land was
released to builders contingent on their proposed architectural designs and the
land cost was integrated into the purchase price of the house which could be
regulated by the Design Approval Committee. Many of the houses were sold at
53 Toronto Real Estate Board figures, based on the number of building permits
issued in 1967, are as follows:
Etobicoke Total number of serviced lots 710
(excluding apartment permits)
Single family permits 660
Semi-detached permits 50
Metro Total number of serviced lots 5,101(excluding apartment permits)
Single family permits 4,070
Semi-detached permits 1,031
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a cost of approximately $40,00054 which effectively removed the possibility of
low-income, or even middle-income families being able to purchase them.
The Thistletown project, did, however, exemplify the ability of public and
private enterprise to co-operate in the development of a residential community.
There was no shortage of response by private builders to the Partnership tender
call for designs on the single family lots or condominium units although a rep-
resentative of one development company55 commented that this disposal tech-
nique was not advantageous and that it is preferable from the point of view of
the builder to prepare plans and bids on the basis of unserviced land as this
ensures a more rational assessment of cost factors since the adequacy of exist-
ing services for a proposed design is an unknown factor until contruction
begins. Basing a bid on unserviced land provides a leverage to the builder to
adjust the cost factors in construction (i.e., servicing costs, materials, etc.)
while maintaining a constant end price.
Because Thistletown did not meet its stated goals does not mean that
the project is without political or social significance. It does highlight the need
for integrated planning and co-operation by all levels of government respon-
sible in fact or constitutionally for housing and community services, and per-
haps the need for a re-evaluation of the practical effects of utilizing senior
government agencies and representatives in land development negotiations
with municipalities. The starting point for any re-assessment of planning and
housing responsibilities is best enunciated by the Waterloo Local Government
Review:
If broad planning and local area planning are to achieve some success . . ., it will
be important that a rapport be established between those responsible for planning
at the local level and those at the provincial level. To achieve this it is vital for both
to be able to identify each other's responsibility and magnitude of political power.50
And because of its financial importance in the implementation of planning
schemes (through broad economic policies or specific programs relating to con-
struction and housing) the federal government should not be excluded from
this initial delineation of responsibility and power from which a realistic per-
ception of the requirements for inter-government co-operation might emerge.
54 Toronto Star, October 18, 1969.
55 Mr. A. Zimet, Vice-President, Bramalea Consolidated Developments Ltd. in an
interview March 10, 1970. Bramalea Consolidated Developments Ltd. did not participate
in the tender call for designs on single family lots on the grounds that in its assessment
the cost of the serviced land was disproportionately high for the area at the time of
disposal.
56 Waterloo Local Government Review (1970) 151.
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